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Abstract
Legal analysis is a task underlying many forms of legal problem solving. In the Anglo-American
legal system, legal analysis is based in part on legal precedents, previously decided cases. This paper
describes a reduction-graph model of legal precedents that accounts for a key characteristic of legal
precedents: a precedent’s relevance to subsequent cases is determined by the theory under which the
precedent is decided. This paper identifies the implementation requirements for legal analysis using
the reduction-graph model of legal precedents and describes GREBE, a program that satisfies these
requirements.
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1. Introduction
Attorneys engage in a variety of professional activities, including advocacy, legal
planning, adjudication, counseling, and drafting legal documents. Underlying each of these
activities is the task of legal analysis, which consists of determining and ranking the
strongest arguments for and against a legal conclusion, given a set of facts and a collection
of legal authorities.1 For example, advocacy requires determining the strongest arguments
that can be made on behalf of a legal conclusion and anticipating the strongest arguments
likely to be made against it. Planning consists of determining a sequence of actions
E-mail address: karl.branting@livewirelogic.com (L.K. Branting).
1 The first use of the term “legal analysis” as a computational task was apparently in [48], where it was defined
as “the logical derivation of a legal conclusion from a particular factual situation in the light of some body of legal
doctrine”.
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that achieves a given set of legal goals. This requires assessing the legal propositions
satisfied under the facts that would result from execution of each alternative sequence
of the actions. Document drafting requires assessing the legal propositions satisfied by
possible configurations of textual elements. In counseling, the task is to predict the
likeliest legal outcome of litigation under various scenarios. Finally, adjudication consists
of resolving conflicting claims by identifying the claim that is supported by the strongest
argument.
The information-processing requirements of legal analysis can be summarized as
follows:
Input:
• A set of facts representing a state of affairs.
• A collection of legal authorities.
• A goal proposition consisting of a legal predicate applied to one or more entities in the
set of facts.
Output:
• An analysis consisting of the strongest arguments for and against the goal proposition
based on the legal authorities, ranked by strength or persuasiveness.
The legal authorities used in legal analysis include legal rules and legal precedents,
past cases in which a court resolved a legal dispute [13]. There are several types
of legal rules, including: statutory rules, which are enactments of federal, state, and
local legislative bodies; common-law rules, which are enunciated by appellate courts;
constitutions; treaties; and regulations.
In countries whose legal systems are derived from English Common Law—including
the U.S. and most of the rest of the English-speaking world—prior precedents can have the
force of law as to subsequent legal cases. Precedents also play an important, although
less formal, role in legal reasoning in countries whose legal systems are based on the
Napoleanic Civil Code, which includes most countries of Europe other than Britain and
Ireland.
The common-law doctrine of stare decisis2 holds that inherent in every judicial decision
is a “declaration and interpretation of a general principle or rule of law”3 and that this
declaration is “authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must be applied
in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties”.4 Prototype cases are cases that have not
actually been decided by any court but are nevertheless persuasive because they reflect a
consensus about the legal consequences of an idealized or typical situation.
In addition to legal rules and precedents, other factors such as general conceptions of
justice and fair play (e.g., “No man may profit from his own wrong”) can sometimes play
an important role in legal analysis. However, there is little consensus as to precisely how
2 Stare decisis is an abbreviation for stare decisis et non quieta movere, meaning “to stand by precedents and
not to disturb settled points”.
3 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) 177–178.
4 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991).
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the relationship between principles, on the one hand, and legal rules and precedents, on the
other, should be modeled.
The performance of a computer system intended to emulate human expertise in legal
analysis can be evaluated by the system’s ability to create and rank arguments in the same
fashion as human legal experts, such as judges, law professors, and experienced attorneys.
In view of the central role of precedents in legal analysis, the performance of a satisfactory
system for legal analysis must include use of precedents in a manner persuasive to human
experts.
Arguments by human legal experts are shaped not only by the facts and outcome
of precedents, but also by precedents’ theory of decision, that is, intermediate concepts
that justify their outcome in terms of the facts [26]. Thus, a system for legal analysis
that emulates human performance must also make use of precedents’ theory of deci-
sion.
This paper proposes a knowledge-level model of legal analysis that addresses the role
of both the facts and theory of precedents. This model makes no assumptions about
the particular representational requirements for expressing factual situations and legal
authorities.5 The model also makes no assumptions about the manner in which collections
of facts are compared, whether through structural similarity [67], dimensions or factors
[1,3,4,56], shared abstractions [48], or some other mechanism. The model assumes only
that the relevant similarities and differences between collections of facts can be assessed
through some method.
Section 2 of the paper describes how precedents are used in legal argumentation.
The structure of legal precedents is described in Section 3. Section 4 sets forth a model
of legal precedents that includes not just the facts and outcome, but the intermediate
reasoning steps, or theory, connecting the two. These reasoning steps are represented as
a reduction graph. Section 5 enumerates the computational requirements for a system that
performs legal analysis using a reduction-graph representation of precedents and describes
an implementation and evaluation of the model in GREBE. An empirical evaluation of
GREBE is described in Section 6.
2. The role of precedents in legal argumentation
Precedents are important in legal analysis both because of the general principle that
like cases should be treated alike and because of the practical difficulties that would
arise in a legal system consisting just of rules. Predicates in legal rules are frequently
too abstract to be operational, but are instead intelligible only in terms of exemplars. For
example, the applicability of legal rules for liability or guilt in a particular case depends on
whether abstract, general predicates like “reasonable care”, “excessive speed”, “malice”, or
“activity in furtherance of employment” are satisfied by the facts of particular cases. Such
abstract legal predicates, which have been termed “open-textured” in the jurisprudential
5 However, as discussed below in Section 5.1, there is ample reason to believe that a relational representation
is necessary to represent both factual situations and legal authorities.
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literature [34], are used by drafters of legal rules because it is impossible, as a practical
matter, to anticipate every possible set of facts intended to be covered by a rule. The gap
in abstraction between legal predicates appearing in rule antecedents and the concrete,
specific actions and events constituting specific cases can give rise to uncertainty about
whether the predicates are satisfied by the case [23]. However, arguments for or against
the application of a legal predicate to a given factual situation can be based on the
relevant similarities and differences between it and cases known to satisfy or not satisfy
the predicate [24,25,29]. In this paper, an argument based on the relevant similarities and
differences between two specific factual situations will be referred to as an argument by
analogy.
Even when rules are extremely specific, argumentation by analogy may still be
necessary. For example, does a statute passed in the 1920s that prohibits mothers from
selling their babies apply to surrogate mothers? It may be difficult to answer this question
except by reasoning analogically about the similarities and differences between the
prototypical case of baby selling targeted by the statute and the facts of a particular
surrogate motherhood case.6
Finally, analogical reasoning permits judges to resolve disputes in a society in which
there are moral and political disagreements. Requiring judges to justify their decisions
in terms of theories of justice, economic efficiency, or utilitarianism is not feasible both
because it is often unclear what decision best promotes these high-level goals and because
there is generally no consensus as to which of these goals is most important. However,
disputes can be resolved on the basis of agreed cases, even if there is dispute over the exact
principles that justify the cases [60].
Thus, both rules and precedents must be modeled in a system for automated legal
analysis. Rules and precedents are complementary in such a system in that precedents
operationalize rules, while rules are needed to determine the relevance of precedents. Both
rules and precedents can operate as warrants [62] in arguments because each expresses a
relationship between a set of conditions and a legal conclusion justified by those conditions.
3. The structure of legal precedents
The simplest model of a precedent is a single monolithic exemplar. However, in the
Anglo-American law, precedents are typically expressed in a written opinion with the
following elements:
• Procedural history, which establishes that the court has jurisdiction over the case by
showing how the case came to be before the court.
• The relevant facts of the case.
• The issues, i.e., the propositions of law over which the parties to the dispute disagree.
• Identification of the legal authorities applicable to the issues.
6 For a discussion of a federal court decision that used analogical reasoning to address this question, see [60,
p. 86].
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• An analysis of the propositions that applies the relevant legal authorities to the relevant
facts.
• An order resolving the dispute (either settling the claims or sending the case to another
forum for other action, such as gathering additional information).
An opinion with this structure can be viewed as consisting of a special type of legal analysis
distinguished by the following characteristics not found in other forms of legal analysis:
• The analysis is performative, in that the court is empowered to actually assign a truth
value to the legal propositions at issue.
• The procedural history and discussion of jurisdiction establishes the preconditions for
the court’s exercise of the performative.
What has been termed the orthodox view of precedent [41] holds that the portion of
a precedent that is authoritative in subsequent cases consists of the statements in the
precedent necessary to resolve the case before the court. These statements are referred
to by attorneys as the ratio decidendi:
A ratio decidendi is a ruling expressly or impliedly given by a judge which is sufficient
to settle a point of law put in issue by the parties’ arguments in a case, being a point on
which a ruling was necessary to his justification (or one of his alternative justifications)
of the decisions in the case [42, p. 170].
In contrast, language in a precedent that is unnecessary for the decision is termed dictum.
Dictum may be persuasive to other courts, but it is not authoritative in subsequent cases.
Although many legal scholars would argue that the orthodox view is a drastic simplification
of the actual use of precedents in legal discourse and problem solving, this view arguably
provides a core set of conditions necessary for any adequate computational model of
precedent.
For purposes of exposition, consider the highly simplified, fictional legal precedent
(which glosses over many of the complexities of actual legal decisions) set forth in Fig. 1.
Under the orthodox view, the ratio decidendi of this case can be paraphrased as follows:
Adams is not liable to Baker for battery because battery requires a harmful or offensive
touching to which there was no consent. The requirement of absence of consent was
not satisfied because Baker implicitly consented to having his hockey stick struck by
another hockey stick. This is because the contact occurred when he was playing hockey
and such contacts are customary in hockey play.
The statement that hitting a stick is a sufficient contact to satisfy the requirements for
touching is dictum, because the decision in the case would have been the same (i.e., no
battery) even if the court had reached the opposite conclusion about the touching.
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4. A reduction-graph model of precedentA justification for the conclusion that a legal proposition is satisfied under the facts
of a case consists of a warrant for the proposition together with all inferences necessary
to match the antecedents of the warrant to the facts of the case. Various representations
of such a justification are possible. A reduction graph represents a justification in terms
of the subgoals that arise in the process of constructing an inference path from the
predicate to be established to the facts of a case.7 Under this representation, each warrant
is a reduction operator that expresses the connection between a goal and its subgoals.
A reduction operator can consist of a rule having a goal as its consequent and subgoals as
its antecedents, an exemplar of the subgoal (i.e., a warrant having the goal as its consequent
and a set of specific facts as its antecedent), or two collections of similar facts, termed an
analogy.
Reduction operators can have an associated certainty or persuasiveness. For example,
the persuasiveness of an analogy depends on the degree of relevant similarity between
the collections of facts. This can be measured using standard analogical or CBR metrics
such as distance in some metric space [43,63] or structural similarity [7,28,31,36,67].
A reduction operator can also be annotated with its backing [62]—that is, the reason for
believing that the goal conclusion follows from the subgoals.
Under the reduction-graph model, the ratio decidendi of a precedent for a legal
proposition consists of each reduction operator in the reduction graph for the proposition.
Other portions of the precedent are dictum and therefore not binding on subsequent cases.
4.1. Examples of reduction graphs
If only the facts and the outcome were considered, the fictional Adams v. Baker case
(shown in Fig. 1) could be modeled as a reduction graph, as shown in Fig. 2.8 In this
representation, the case has no theory of decision; there are no intermediate concepts
between the facts and the ultimate conclusion.
Alternatively, if the decision’s intermediate conclusions were made explicit, the decision
could be modeled by the pair of reduction graphs shown in Fig. 3. Under this interpretation,
the theory of decision is that there was consent to the touching because the touching
occurred during a hockey game.9 The backing for the top-most reduction operator (battery
is satisfied if and only if there is touching and no consent) is indicated by “[Rest. §8]”,
meaning Section 8 of the Second Restatement of Torts, a formalization of the common law
rules adopted in many jurisdictions. Note that the reduction graph justifying touching is
7 See [6] for a general description of reduction graphs and [2] for an illustration of the equivalence between
state-space and reduction-graph representations. An alternative representation of reduction graphs—warrant-
reduction graphs—that makes explicit (1) the order of reduction-operator applications and (2) the warrants for
the decision formed by each reduction-operator application, is described in [18].
8 For clarity of exposition, an informal propositional representation of predicates and facts is used in the figures
set forth below. However, as discussed in Section 5.1, a full representation of the facts and warrants requires a
more expressive relational representation.
9 A complete representation of the facts would have to include that the touching was of a type customary in
the hockey game during which it occurred; for expository purposes, a simplification of the facts is displayed.
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Procedural history.
Baker sued Adams for battery in district court. The jury awarded
$1,000 to Baker. Adams appeals the judgment to a court with
jurisdiction over appeals.
Facts.
Adams and Baker were players in a hockey game. To keep Baker from
hitting the puck, Adams intentionally used his hockey stick to hit
the hockey stick that Baker was holding. Baker’s thumb was
sprained, causing him $1,000 in medical bills.
Issues.
Adams contends that there was no battery because he didn’t hit
Baker, but only Baker’s stick. He also contends that if hitting the
stick is equivalent to hitting Baker, Baker implicitly consented to
the contact.
Baker contends that hitting his stick is equivalent to hitting
him. Baker agrees that contact between sticks is common in hockey
games, but contends that, nevertheless, he did not consent to it.
Legal authorities.
Under the Restatement of Torts Section 8, the requirements to
establish a claim for battery are (1) a harmful or offensive
touching and (2) no consent.
Analysis.
The requirement for a harmful or offensive touching is satisfied by
the blow to Baker’s stick. However, a hockey player consents to
contacts that are customary in hockey. Adams is therefore not
liable to Baker for battery.
Order.
The judgment against Adams is nullified.
Fig. 1. The simplified, fictional precedent case of Adams v. Baker.
not part of the ratio decidendi, because it is not necessary to the decision in the case. The
decision would have been the same (no battery liability) regardless of whether hitting the
hockey stick constituted a harmful or offensive touching.
There is no unique mapping from a written opinion to a reduction graph, in part because
opinions themselves are frequently ambiguous. Choosing a reduction graph to represent a
precedent is a matter of interpretation; each reduction graph represents an interpretation of
the precedent. Attorneys may disagree in their interpretation of precedents and may create
66 L.K. Branting / Artificial Intelligence 150 (2003) 59–95Fig. 2. Reduction-graph representation of Adams v. Baker in which the sole reduction operator is a warrant that
the facts of Adams v. Baker are sufficient to establish the absence of battery.
Fig. 3. Reduction-graph representation of Adams v. Baker that includes intermediate concepts of touching and
consent.
conflicting arguments based on these conflicting interpretations. Modeling the process of
argumentation whereby an attorney advocates one interpretation of a case over another is
beyond the scope of the present work. However, a working system of precedent rests on
the assumption that some consensus can be reached concerning the meaning of precedents
[42]. Moreover, as a practical matter, there is often a high degree of agreement among
legal experts as to the meaning of particular legal precedents. The reduction-graph model
therefore focuses on how specific interpretations of precedents can be represented and
used in legal analysis. In this paper, the theory of decision of a precedent under a specific
interpretation will be referred to simply as the “theory of decision” when doing so leads to
no ambiguity.
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4.2. Using reduction graphs in legal analysis
The reduction operators in reduction-graph representations of precedents can be used in
the analysis of new cases. Suppose, for example, that in addition to the precedent Adams
v. Baker, there is a second precedent, Clark v. Dexter, in which Clark was held to be liable
to Dexter for battery because Clark punched Dexter on the chin during a family argument.
A possible reduction-graph representation of Clark v. Dexter is shown in Fig. 4. Suppose,
in addition, that there are two new cases:
• NC1, in which Evans punched Ford on the nose during a boxing match.
• NC2, in which Green hit Hughes’ umbrella during an argument over some items on
sale at a department store.
All four cases are summarized in Table 1.
If the warrants available for creating new analyses consisted of the reduction operators
that occur in the precedents, together with analogies, then the arguments for and against
battery liability shown in Figs. 5 and 6 could be constructed for NC1. Each reduction
operator taken from a precedent has that precedent as its backing. For example, “[Adams
v. Baker]” indicates that the reduction operator is part of the ratio decidendi of the Adams
v. Baker case. The argument for the negation of battery (in Fig. 5) is stronger than the
argument for battery (in Fig. 6) because the latter depends on the weak analogy between a
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Table 1
Summary of Adams v. Baker, Clark v. Dexter, and two new cases, NC1 and NC2
Case Legal conclusion Relevant facts
Adams v. Baker ¬ battery hitting hockey stick during
hockey game
Clark v. Dexter battery punching chin during
family argument
NC1 ? punching nose during
boxing match
NC2 ? hitting umbrella during
argument at store
Fig. 5. Reduction-graph representation of the strong argument for no battery liability in NC1.
family argument and a boxing match, whereas the former depends on a stronger analogy
between a hockey game and a boxing match. Similarly, the arguments for and against
battery liability shown in Figs. 7 and 8 could be constructed for NC2. In NC2, the argument
for battery is stronger than the argument against battery because the latter depends on
a weak analogy between a hockey game and an argument at a store. The argument for
battery depends on the strong analogies (1) between a family argument and an argument at
a store and (2) between hitting a hockey stick someone is holding and hitting an umbrella
someone is holding, but is weakened because it depends on one warrant—that hitting a
hockey stick is sufficient for touching—that was merely dictum in Adams v. Baker. This
warrant may be persuasive, but it does not have the force of law.
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Fig. 7. Reduction-graph representation of the weak argument for no battery liability in NC2.
70 L.K. Branting / Artificial Intelligence 150 (2003) 59–95Fig. 8. Reduction-graph representation of an argument for battery liability in NC2 based on two strong analogies
but depending on a warrant that is dictum.
Representation of a precedent as a reduction graph makes explicit the intermediate
reasoning steps in a precedent. As illustrated in Fig. 8, this permits a single new case to
be analogized to relevant portions of multiple precedents. A single precedent can, in other
words, comprise several exemplars. For example, Clark v. Dexter includes an exemplar of
touching and a separate exemplar for the absence of consent.
Exemplars consisting of case facts satisfying intermediate conclusions in a precedent
are termed precedent constituents. Precedent constituents are “case snippets” [37,52] or
“subcases” [35], that is, they are portions of a case’s solution.
Representation of the theory of a decision can not only improve the persuasiveness of
the arguments by permitting a single new case to be analogized to relevant portions of
several precedents, but can also determine which new cases can be decided by a precedent.
The manner in which the theory of decision of a precedent determines its relevance
to subsequent cases can be illustrated with the actual case of Bourhill v. Young,10 the
following relevant facts:
Young, a motorcyclist, was killed because of his own negligence when he passed a tram
at excessive speed and collided with a car about 50 feet beyond the tram. At the time
10 A.C. 92 (1943). The discussion of the alternative theories of decision in Bourhill v. Young in this paper is
based on [26].
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of the accident, the tram was stopped and Mrs. Bourhill was alighting. Mrs. Bourhill
heard the collision and saw blood on the road after the accident and as a result suffered
a nervous shock. Mrs. Bourhill was outside what Young ought to have contemplated as
the area of potential danger that would arise from his careless driving, since she was
alighting on the side of the tram opposite the side on which Young passed.
The decision was that Mrs. Bourhill’s law suit against Young’s estate was dismissed.
From the relevant facts and the decision alone it is impossible to determine which of the
following two theories underlies the decision: (1) a driver owes no duty of care in respect
of his driving to persons outside the area of reasonably foreseeable danger or (2) although
the driver owes a duty of care to such persons, damages flowing from nervous shock are
too remote a consequence of the breach of duty to be recoverable.
Without knowledge of the theory of decision, it is impossible to determine from the
relevant facts and the decision alone how either of the following hypotheticals should be
decided:
• H1. The same facts as Bourhill except that the motorcycle driven by Young collides
with a fireworks truck instead of a car, and Mrs. Bourhill is burned by a fragment from
the resultant explosion of fireworks.
• H2. The same facts as Bourhill except that Young passes the tram on the same side
as the alighting Mrs. Bourhill, missing her by inches and causing a severe emotional
shock.
Under the first theory, Mrs. Bourhill could recover in H2 but not H1. Under the second
theory, the results would be reversed.
The two alternative theories for the decision in Bourhill v. Young can be represented (in
simplified form) by the reduction graphs shown in Figs. 9 and 10. Fig. 9 represents the
justification of Bourhill under the theory that a driver owes no duty of care in respect of his
driving to persons outside the area of reasonably foreseeable danger. Under this theory of
decision, the reduction operators necessary to match this rule to the facts of Bourhill under
the first theory are the following:
• negligence ⇔ duty ∧ breach of that duty ∧ proximate cause.
• If a person is outside the area of foreseeable danger from an activity, then no duty of
reasonable care is owed to that person by the actor.
• If a driver passes on the opposite side of a tram from which the plaintiff is alighting
and has a collision 50 feet beyond the plaintiff, then the plaintiff is outside of the area
of foreseeable danger.
Fig. 10 represents the justification of Bourhill under the theory that damages flowing
from nervous shock are too remote a consequence of the breach of duty to be recoverable.
The reduction operators necessary to match the rule under this theory are the following:
• negligence ⇔ duty ∧ breach of that duty ∧ proximate cause.
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• If the harm complained of is a remote consequence of the breach of duty of reasonable
care, then there is no proximate cause.
• Nervous shock suffered by an observer of an accident is a remote consequence of any
breach of duty of reasonable care by the driver.
Suppose that the first theory of Bourhill was intended to be the theory of decision (as
the text of the opinion makes clear was indeed the case). The lowest generality subgoal in
Fig. 9 matches the facts of H1 just as well as it matches the facts of Bourhill itself. Thus,
the justification for Bourhill under Theory 1, which is represented in Fig. 9, would apply
equally to H1: Young would not be liable because Mrs. Bourhill was outside the area of
foreseeable danger, notwithstanding that an unforeseeable causal chain led to her injury.
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If Theory 2 were the theory of decision,11 the lowest generality subgoal represented in
Fig. 10 would match the facts of H2. Thus, the justification for Bourhill under Theory 2,
which is represented in Fig. 10, would apply equally to H2: nervous shock is a remote
consequence of Young’s breach of duty of reasonable care, notwithstanding that Mrs.
Bourhill was within the area of foreseeable harm.12
In summary, the reduction-graph model permits the analysis of a single case to be based
on its similarity to relevant portions of multiple precedents. In addition, a reduction-graph
representation accounts for the manner in which the theory of decision of a precedent
11 This theory was proposed in the dissent of a case well-known to students in U.S. law schools, Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 399, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
12 Showing how negligence liability would follow in H2 under Theory 1 and in H1 under Theory 2 requires a
precedent in which negligence was found to be present. See [18] for reduction-graph models of such a precedent
under each theory of decision.
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(under a given interpretation), and not merely its facts and outcome, determines which
cases it controls.
4.3. Justification incompleteness
The reduction-graph model makes explicit a theory under which a precedent is decided.
Unfortunately, judicial opinions seldom make explicit all reasoning steps necessary to
justify the court’s decision:
Incompleteness is the rule, not the exception; even a brief examination of cases makes
this apparent . . . Legal decisions contain obvious gaps . . . [66, pp. 1532–1533].
Justification indeterminacy is therefore a practical problem for any model of precedent.
Richard Warner in Three Theories of Legal Reasoning [66] suggests that gaps in the
reasoning of precedents can occur when there are several alternative justifications leading
to the same conclusion. “[S]ince the court could decide the case without choosing any
one alternative, the court may simply not have chosen any”. Regardless of their source,
such gaps can only be bridged by constructing a plausible inference step: “[C]ompleting
incomplete legal reasoning is typically a matter of constructing premises, not of divining
what unstated premises were in the mind of the court”.
Three distinct approaches to the problem of justification incompleteness can be
distinguished. One approach is to adopt the most plausible completion of the missing
reasoning steps. The result of this approach is a representation of the ratio decidendi under
one construction of the decision.13 This construction, and therefore the corresponding
representation of the ratio decidendi, might have to be revised in light of subsequent
decisions interpreting the precedent. Meanwhile, the system can use a plausible and
complete representation of the precedent’s ratio decidendi.
A second approach is to represent all plausible completions of the justification of a
decision, suitably annotating the alternative reasoning steps. This amounts to representing
a precedent as a set of plausible rationes. The benefit of this approach is that it
provides a mechanism for modeling the ability of skillful attorneys to base a variety of
plausible arguments on a single precedent by exploiting the ambiguities in the precedent’s
justification.
The most conservative approach is to omit any implicit reasoning steps, retaining only
those warrants stated explicitly. This approach has the benefit of precluding spurious
warrants at the cost of making it impossible to model an attorney’s ability to generate
the plausible constructions of a precedent.
A choice from among these approaches to justification incompleteness must be made in
any implemented model of precedent. Criteria for making this choice include the purposes
for which the precedents are being modeled and the manner in which the representations
of rationes will be used. The representation of the theory of a precedent that best models
13 As discussed in Section 5.2, this approach was used in the development of GREBE’s workmen’s
compensation knowledge base.
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attorneys’ use of precedents is probably one in which “gaps” in the justification of the
precedent have been bridged by one or more plausible constructions of the precedent.14
4.4. Justifications for warrants
Under the reduction-graph model, the warrants in the justification of a judicial decision
that are authoritative as to subsequent cases include a warrant for the ultimate result and
all reduction operators necessary to match the antecedent of this warrant to the facts of the
case. Under the orthodox view of precedent, these warrants constitute the ratio decidendi
because if any were negated, the decision would no longer follow from the remaining
warrants [65].
However, the warrants constituting the ratio decidendi of a precedent may themselves
have justifications. Two forms of such justifications for warrants can be distinguished.
The backing for a warrant consists of the institutional justification for believing that the
warrant’s consequent follows from its antecedents. For example, the backing of a statutory
rule consists of the authority under which the statute was enacted. Similarly, the backing
for a precedent constituent is the authority of the court to decide the case. In the examples
above, the backing for the rule for battery was the Second Restatement of Torts and the
backing for the warrant that hockey is an example of a situation in which there is consent
to a touching is the case of Clark v. Dexter. Thus, the backing for a warrant is related to its
“pedigree or the manner in which [it] was adopted or developed” [27, p. 17], rather than to
its content.
The rationale for a warrant, by contrast, consists of the purposes, motivations, or policy
underlying the content of the warrant. The rationale for warrants representing the resolution
of legal issues can include social custom, historical development, and models of social
justice. Legal discourse frequently makes reference to the rationale underlying legal rules
and decisions [8,11].
The reduction-graph model proposed in this paper includes the backing of warrants as
annotations, but does not include the rationales of warrants in the ratio decidendi, that
is, the rationale is not itself a warrant and, therefore, does not determine the outcome of
subsequent cases. There are several reasons for excluding justifications for warrants from
the ratio decidendi.
First, as discussed in Section 2, there is often no agreement as to the abstract principles
justifying decisions. For example, a given criminal sentence may be justified by retribution,
rehabilitation, deterrence, prevention, or some mixture of these policies. As a practical
matter, it may be impossible for a society to reach a consensus about the relative
importance of these factors. However, there is a consensus that similar crimes should
have similar punishments. This permits the criminal justice system to operate even though
there are disagreements about the underlying rationale. Similarly, strict financial liability
for distributors of contaminated food is favored by some on the grounds of economic
efficiency, by others to achieve distributive goals, and by still others to promote a basic
14 The task of automatically generating plausible justifications to bridge gaps in the reasoning of precedents is
a form of abduction [50].
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right to safe food. Despite their disagreements, advocates of these conflicting positions
may all agree that distributors of contaminated food should be held strictly liable for any
harm resulting from food contamination. In general, there can be agreement about specific
cases even when, as is often the case in a democratic society, there is disagreement about
the rationale for those specific cases.15
Second, judicial decisions often contain little or no discussion of the principles or
policies underlying the warrants applied in the case. Moreover, a warrant expressed in
a precedent can control subsequent cases even if commentators agree that the rationale for
the warrant is specious.16
Finally, it is possible for a precedent to continue to be authoritative even though
the rationale underlying the decision is gradually eroded [12]. Such shifts in rationales
may eventually lead to a change in the law. However, until such a shift occurs, it is
the decision, and not the rationale, of a precedent the applies directly to subsequent
cases.
5. Implementing the reduction-graph model
Section 4 proposed a model of precedent as a reduction graph connecting a legal
conclusion to the facts of the precedent by a series of reduction-operator applications.
Under this model, an argument in support of a legal conclusion also consists of a reduction
graph whose operators are drawn from precedents and other sources of legal warrants, such
as legal rules.
This section describes (1) the information-processing requirements of the reduction-
graph model of analysis, (2) an implementation of the model in a program called GREBE,
and (3) an analysis system constructed by adding a knowledge base for Texas Workmen’s
Compensation law to GREBE.
5.1. Information processing requirements
Any implementation of the reduction-graph model of legal analysis must satisfy
the requirements for legal analysis set forth in Section 1. In addition, it must include
(1) a formalism for expressing precedents as reduction-graphs and (2) algorithms for
constructing new reduction graphs from precedents and legal rules. The information
processing requirements for legal analysis using the reduction-graph model of precedent
can be summarized as follows:
Input:
• A set of facts.
• A collection of legal authorities consisting of
15 These examples are based on [60].
16 See [18, pp. 59–60] for a discussion of criticism by legal scholars of the rationale for the decision in Hochster
v. Delatour, 2 E. & B. 678 (1853), a case that, nevertheless, became a leading case in contracts.
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– warrants occurring as reduction-operators in precedents (under some interpretation),
including rules and precedent constituents,
– legal rules from sources other than precedents, such as statutes,
– any additional knowledge sources required for constructing arguments based on
similarities and differences between collections of facts.
• A goal proposition consisting of a legal predicate applied to one or more entities in the
set of facts.
• An evaluation criterion for ranking arguments by strength.
Do:
• Find each reduction graph that can be constructed from the legal authorities for the
goal proposition and its negation.
• Rank the reduction graphs under the argument evaluation criterion.
• Present the ranked reduction graphs to the user in a comprehensible fashion.
Any implementation satisfying these information-processing requirements must resolve
five distinct design issues. The first is a representation language for case facts and legal
authorities. A propositional representation for case facts enforces representational consis-
tency and simplifies case entry and matching. However, propositional representations give
rise to the possibility that relevant aspects of new cases may not be expressible within the
available set of propositions, particularly in domains such as law in which the relevant as-
pects of cases include causal, temporal, and intentional relations among case entities. This
is because it is impossible to anticipate every configuration of causal, temporal, and inten-
tional relations that could arise in some future case [44]. It is typically the relationships
among entities, rather than the identity of the entities, that give rise to legal relationships.
As a result, most models of analogical legal reasoning have used relational representations,
such as the frames (e.g., [30,48]), semantic networks (e.g., [7,67]), and first-order predicate
calculus (e.g., [44]). Moreover, most serious efforts to formalize legal rules have used Horn
clauses or first-order predicate calculus (e.g., [9,58]).
The second design decision issue is a mechanism for assessing similarity between cases,
that is, determining the degree to which the cases are analogous. A decision on this issue
is closely tied to the decision on representation of case facts. If cases are represented as
points in feature space, similarity assessment may take the form of a distance metric [43].
Similarity between frames can be assessed by determining the nearest common ancestor in
a taxonomic hierarchy between corresponding slot values [48]. If cases are represented
in terms of legally relevant factors or dimensions, three-ply arguments can be created
concerning their relevant similarities and differences [3]. Structural similarity can be used
as a similarity metric for pairs of cases represented using relational formalisms [7,28,31,
36,67].
The third design issue is selection of a control strategy for building new reduction
graphs. A key requirement is that the control strategy permit integration of warrants
of different degrees of abstraction. For example, CABARET uses an agenda-driven
control architecture based on a theory of statutory argument to interleave rule and
case application [53,57,59]. Similarly, EXPANDER uses a blackboard architecture to
manage the interaction between rules and cases [64]. Alternatively, as described below
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in Section 5.2, sequences of applicable reduction-operators can be evaluated and ranked
after they are generated.
A fourth design decision concerns the methods used to interact with the user. The
system must elicit the facts and goals constituting a problem statement from a user and
present the analysis to the user. There is typically a tradeoff between the expressiveness
of the representation formalism used for case facts and the burden imposed on a user
to represent the facts of a new case [15]. If cases are represented as feature vectors,
for example, representing a new case is straightforward, but the variety of problems
that can be posed is drastically limited. On the other hand, representing even a simple
case in first-order predicate calculus is a challenging undertaking even for someone
experienced in logic. One approach to reducing the difficulty of eliciting cases expressed
in a relational representation is to provide users a graphical case editor [47]. Narrative
grammars represent an alternative approach to striking a balance between expressiveness
and tractability [17]. Progress in natural language processing technology may make textual
entry of cases increasingly practical.
A reduction-graph analysis must be presented to the user in a comprehensible fashion.
As discussed below, one approach is to instantiate text templates corresponding to
categories of reduction operators. However, human-like output requires augmenting the
formal analysis using a model of the discourse conventions of legal arguments.17
Finally, some evaluation criterion for argument strength must be specified. Generally
speaking, reduction operators based on logical rules make the maximum possible
contribution to the strength of the resulting argument. Reduction operators involving
similarity between cases separated in metric space or having structural differences or that
involve matching concepts through common ancestors in taxonomic hierarchies weaken an
argument.
5.2. GREBE: An implementation of the reduction-graph model
GREBE (Generator of Recursive Exemplar-Based Explanations) is a computer system
that satisfies the information-processing requirements of the reduction-graph model.18
5.2.1. Representation
GREBE uses a relational representation in the form of ground tuples for the facts of
precedents and new cases. As mentioned above, a relational representation is desirable
because the variety of facts that can give rise to legal problems is essentially unbounded,
and any non-relational representation inevitably precludes even formulating many possible
problems. Rules are represented as Horn clauses.
17 For example, [22] proposes a discourse model for a class of legal documents expressing a legal analysis,
jurisdictional show-cause orders.
18 Portions of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 originally appeared in [14]. The presentation here emphasizes the
relationship between GREBE’s design and the reduction-graph model of precedent, which was not addressed
in [14]. A more extensive discussion of this relationship is set forth in [18].
L.K. Branting / Artificial Intelligence 150 (2003) 59–95 79
5.2.2. Similarity assessment
Similarity assessment between pairs of cases is performed by structure matching.
Structural congruence as a similarity metric has been studied extensively by the analogical
reasoning community [28,31,36,67]. Two analogs are structurally congruent for the
purposes of analogical matching if “objects in . . . two analogs can be placed into
correspondence so that relations also correspond” [36]. This view of analogy focuses
on “relational commonalities independently of the objects in which those relations are
embedded” [32].
The correspondence between analogs is generally modeled as a mapping from the
objects in one analog to those in another. The case constituting the domain of the mapping
is customarily referred to as the source of the mapping, and the case constituting the range
of the mapping is referred to as the target. In analogical legal reasoning, a legal precedent
(or precedent constituent) is the source case and the new case is the target.
GREBE performs a greedy search for the mapping that embeds the highest proportion
of source tuples in the target. Tuples whose predicates are semantically related are treated
as partial matches, based on their nearest common ancestor in a taxonomic hierarchy.
Input to the structure-matching algorithm is the following:
• a new case NC,
• a proposition, (PredA1 . . .An), to be justified in NC, and
• a precedent constituent PC for predicate Pred, consisting of
– a set of facts represented as tuples, T , and
– the proposition (PredB1 . . .Bn) for which the precedent constituent is a warrant.
The mapping returned by the algorithm is constrained to include the correspondence
between the objects in the proposition justified by the precedent constituent and objects in
the goal proposition:
B1 ⇒A1,
. . .
Bn ⇒An.
The structure mapping algorithm returns a mapping that matches the highest proportion
of source tuples in the target together with any source tuples unmatched under this
mapping.
GREBE treats unmatched tuples as subgoals to be satisfied by any available reduction
operator (hence the “R”, for “Recursive”, in the acronym “GREBE”). The motivation for
this policy is the observation that in some legal arguments the analogy between two cases
depends on characteristics of the target case that are inferred, rather than explicitly stated.19
19 In domains other than law, case-based reasoning has also been used to assist in matching and adaptation,
e.g., [39].
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Table 2
Reduction operators in GREBE
Reduction operator Strength
exact match 1.0
rule 1.0
precedent constituent 1.0
analogy proportion of matched tuples
semantic similarity closeness in taxonomic hierarchy
5.2.3. Control strategy
Four types of reduction operators are distinguished in GREBE, as set forth in Table 2.
A reduction step consisting of an exact match introduces no uncertaintly, nor does a
reduction step that consists of replacing a rule’s consequent with its antecedents; all rules
are assumed to be reliable. Similarly, a reduction step using a precedent constituent, which
reduces a goal to a set of facts known to satisfy the goal, introduces no uncertainty. By
contrast, an analogy consisting of a match of one set of facts with another introduces
uncertainty proportional to the number of unmatched source tuples. Similarly, a warrant
based on the semantic similarity between predicates in two tuples introduces uncertainty
proportional to the distance between the predicates in a taxonomic hierarchy.
The algorithm for creating analyses is as follows:
GIVEN:
a proposition, (Pred Arg1 . . .Argn), and
a new case NC
DO:
IF (Pred Arg1 . . .Argn) unifies with a proposition in NC
THEN return a trivial argument
ELSE IF (Pred′Arg1 . . .Argn) unifies with a proposition in NC, where Pred′ is
semantically similar to Pred
THEN return a semantic argument
ELSE
1. //rule-based reasoning
FOR EVERY rule R whose consequent unifies with (Pred Arg1 . . .Argn)
IF the antecedents A1 . . .Am of R have arguments E(A1) . . .E(Am)
THEN return a rule-based reduction with warrant R supported by arguments
E(A1) . . .E(Am)
2. //analogical reasoning
IF (Pred Arg1 . . .Argn) is a ground atomic sentence
THEN
(a) //precedent retrieval
Find PC+ and PC−, the instance and non-instance precedent constituents of
Pred most similar to NC
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(b) //structure matching
FOR EVERY PC ∈ {PC+ PC−} find the best mapping, M : PC ⇒ NC, from
the facts of PC onto NC
(c) //match improvement
FOR EVERY PC ∈ {PC+ PC−}:
(i) IF the match between PC and NC would be improved if facts f1 . . . fm
were true in NC
THEN attempt to find arguments for f1 . . . fm. Let E(fi) . . .E(fj ) be
the successful arguments and fk . . .fl be the facts that could not be
justified.
(ii) IF the match between NC and PC meets the acceptability threshold after
match improvement
THEN return an analogical argument for (Pred Arg1 . . .Argn) (or
¬(Pred Arg1 . . .Argn) if PC was a non-instance of Pred) with grounds
M : PC ⇒ NC and E(fi) . . .E(fj ) and qualification fk . . .fl .
(d) IF there are two analogical arguments
THEN return conflicting arguments
ELSE IF there is one analogical argument
THEN return it
ELSE return failure
Determining the precedent constituents most similar to the facts of the new case requires
an indexing scheme for cases represented as collections of tuples. Various algorithms have
been developed for this task, including two-stage retrieval algorithms [33,51], retrieval
by constraint satisfaction [61], and schemes using common subgraphs as indices [40,49].
Two retrieval algorithms were implemented in GREBE: best-first incremental matching
and match refinement by structural difference links. The performance of these algorithms,
which is similar to the performance of two-stage retrieval, is discussed in [18].
5.2.4. Input and output
GREBE requires case facts to be entered in the form of a list of tuples. Posing a
problem requires the facts of the new case to be presented together with a goal proposition
consisting of a predicate and arguments drawn from objects in the case description. Thus,
GREBE does not address the problem of assisting users in formulating a new problem in a
consistent, accurate fashion.
The legal analysis produced by GREBE is presented in the form of a memorandum
created by template instantiation. Reduction graphs structures have a simple recursive
structure that lends itself well to template instantiation techniques.20
GREBE’s memorandum generator operates in two steps. First, it sorts the arguments by
a heuristic estimate of their strength. It then prints a natural-language equivalent of one or
more of the arguments, starting with the strongest. The natural-language equivalent of each
20 A more sophisticated document grammar approach to automated drafting of legal documents is set forth in
[19–22]. For a discussion of issues involved in drafting routine judicial documents, see [16].
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argument is formed by instantiating natural-language templates corresponding to classes
of predicates and types of warrants.
Argument evaluation. GREBE creates multiple arguments whenever multiple warrants
are applicable to a given goal. The first step of the memorandum generator is to order these
arguments by an estimate of their strength. One argument can be weaker than another
either because it contains an analogy involving a partial mapping from a source to a target
or because it contains a semantic argument.
No plausible scheme for assigning numerical measures of importance to the relevant
facts of precedent constituents has been proposed [5]. As a result, GREBE uses the
heuristic of assigning equal weights to all the facts of a precedent constituent. The strength
assigned to an analogical argument is thus the proportion of tuples matched under the
best mapping following match improvement. A match explained by a semantic argument
counts as a partial match. For example, if a precedent constituent has 10 facts, of which 8
are matched under the best mapping onto a new case and one is matched by a semantic
argument of strength 0.2, the strength of the analogical argument is calculated to be
(8+ 0.2)/10= 0.82.
However, the fact that matching can be recursive complicates the computation of the
degree of match. The proportion of matches in recursive matches is determined by dividing
the number of mismatches in any of the nested precedent constituents by the number
of unique observable features in all of the precedent constituents. In effect, a hierarchy
of precedent constituents is flattened into a single collection of observable facts for the
purposes of determining the degree of match.
For example, suppose that the warrant for proposition P in new case NC is precedent
constituent PC1, with facts F1 ∧ AF1 ∧ AF2, that the warrant for AF1 is PC2, which has
facts F2 ∧ F3, and that the warrant for AF2 is PC3, having facts F4 ∧ F5. Suppose that
NC has facts F1 ∧ F2 ∧ F5. The strength of the argument of P in NC is the ratio of
the number of matches at any level to the number of observable features at any level:
|F1,F2,F5|/|F1,F2,F3,F4,F5| = 3/5= 0.6.
GREBE calculates the strength of a semantic argument to be the semantic similarity
between the predicate in the explained fact and the predicate in the grounds. The semantic
similarity between two predicates is, in turn, inversely proportional to the traversal distance
between the predicates in a semantic hierarchy.
Calculation of the contribution of other reduction operators to the strength of an
argument is straightforward: The strength of a reduction based on a rule is the minimum
of the strengths of the arguments of its antecedents. The strength of conjunctions and
disjunctions is the minimum of the strengths of the conjuncts and the maximum of the
strengths of the disjuncts, respectively.
Template instantiation. Tuples appearing in an analysis are converted into text strings
using templates corresponding to classes of predicates. For example, amount-of and agent-
of belong to a class having the template:
〈arg1 “was the” predicate arg2〉
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Text strings created from tuples are then used to instantiate templates corresponding to
each reduction operator type. For example, the template for reductions based on analogies
is:
〈“That” proposition “follows from the” (very strong, strong, moderate, weak) “analogy
between the given case and the facts of” precedent constituent “that were relevant to the
conclusion that” proposition-explained-by-the-precedent constituent “This analogy is
supported by the following:” supporting-arguments “Relevant differences . . . are that”
unmatched-tuples〉
Whether the analogy is “very strong”, “strong”, “moderate”, or “weak” is determined
by the strength of the analogical argument, that is, the proportion of unmatched tuples.
The template for conflicting analogical arguments includes language that depends on the
relative strength of the two conflicting analogical arguments. If they are very close to the
same strength, the memorandum generator produces
〈“On one hand” ReductionGraph1 “On the other hand” ReductionGraph2〉
However, if one analogical argument is much stronger than the other or if one case
represents an exception to another the output is
〈“The stronger argument is that” ReductionGraph1 “However, a weaker argument can
be made that” ReductionGraph2〉
Successive sentences with parallel structure are aggregated into compound sentences to
produce more natural discourse. The memorandum generator has both a verbose mode, in
which it prints the complete analysis, and a comparison mode, in which it prints only those
portions of an analysis that differ from the immediately preceding analysis.
5.3. The workmen’s compensation knowledge base
A prototype knowledge base was implemented within GREBE for the portion of Texas
workmen’s compensation law concerning whether injuries incurred during traveling are
compensable under workmen’s compensation. The worker’s compensation knowledge
base contains approximately 57 legal and common-sense rules, and ratio decidendi of 20
precedents, including 16 published opinions and 4 prototypical cases,21 represented as 35
distinct precedent constituents. The mean number of tuples per precedent constituent is
approximately 30.
The rules and precedent constituents representing each precedent reflect an interpreta-
tion of that precedent by the knowledge engineer of the knowledge base. There was no
validation of these interpretations nor of the representation of the facts of precedents as
21 Other systems using prototype cases include Gardner’s contract formation system [30], BankXX, which
used “legal stories” [54,55], and McCarty’s “prototypes and deformations” model [45,46].
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tuples. In some cases, these interpretations, while plausible, differ from the interpretation
that some domain experts might make.22
GREBE’s performance can be illustrated with its analysis of an actual case, Jarek’s
Case, 326 Mass. 182, 93 N.E.2d 533 (1950). A summary of the facts of Jarek’s Case is as
follows:
Jarek was employed as a railroad porter and normally worked from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00
P.M. Because of an unusual work-load, Jarek’s employer asked him to work late. Jarek
requested and was given permission to walk several blocks home to tell his wife that he
would be working late. He slipped and was seriously injured while walking home.
In Jarek’s Case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that Jarek was not entitled to
workers’ compensation benefits because his trip home was solely for the employee’s
benefit. This result was criticized by the leading authority on workers’ compensation as
“archaic” on the grounds that the employer’s imposition of overtime work necessitated
Jarek’s trip home to relieve his wife’s anxiety [38]. This conflict between a court and a
leading commentator suggests that Jarek’s Case is a hard, and therefore interesting, case.
Fig. 11 is a partial representation of the facts of Jarek’s Case. At the top of the graph is a
node representing the employment relation with Jarek as employee, a Railroad as employer,
and duties of portering. The Railroad directed Jarek to engage in overtime portering, and
this action gave rise to a family need on the part of Jarek. The intensity of this need
would have been decreased by Jarek informing his wife of the schedule change. However,
a prerequisite for informing his wife was that Jarek be at home. Being at home would have
been achieved by Jarek’s special trip home, and the Railroad gave permission for Jarek to
make the trip. The full representation of the facts of Jarek’s Case contains 89 propositions
(corresponding to 89 relations among 26 objects).
GREBE’s analysis of Jarek’s Case is initiated by posing to GREBE the question
whether Jarek’s employer is liable under workers’ compensation for Jarek’s injury under
the facts of Jarek’s Case. Workers’ compensation liability is not given in the facts of
Jarek’s Case, so GREBE searches for reduction operators (rules, precedent constituents, or
semantic relations) that would enable it to establish workers’ compensation liability. It finds
only a single statutory rule, Vernon’s Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8309 §1, having workers’
compensation liability as its consequent. It then attempts to establish the antecedent of this
rule: that Jarek’s injury was “sustained in the course” of that employment.
After subgoaling through another rule, an antecedent is reached—that Jarek’s traveling
home was an activity “in furtherance of employment”—that is not given in the facts of
the case and matches no rules. GREBE therefore searches for precedent constituents for
an activity “in furtherance of employment” and the structurally most similar precedent
constituent for an activity not “in furtherance of employment”. The precedent constituent
for an activity “in furtherance of employment” most similar to Jarek’s Case is Vaughn-
ifo-pc,23 and the most similar precedent constituent for an activity not “in furtherance
22 See [11] for a discussion of such a case.
23 Vaughn v. Highland Underwriters Ins. Co., 445 S.W.2d 234 (1969) was a case in which a worker, Vaughn,
was found to be entitled to workmen’s compensation for an injury sustained when he was traveling to a restaurant.
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of employment”, is Typical-commuting-home-not-ifo-pc, a prototype case of commuting.
A portion of the representation of the facts of Typical-commuting-home-not-ifo-pc in the
workmen’s compensation knowledge base are shown in Fig. 12.
There is a perfect match between the facts of Typical-commuting-home-not-ifo-pc and
Jarek’s Case, indicating that Jarek’s Case contains all the facts of an ordinary commuting
trip. However, there are several unmatched relations in Vaughn under the best mapping
from Vaughn to Jarek’s Case. Three semantic and two analogical reductions can be created
to improve the match between Vaughn and Jarek’s Case. Since analogical arguments can
be constructed both for and against the conclusion that Jarek’s traveling was in furtherance
of his employment (that is, the case matches both Typical-commuting-home-not-ifo-pc and
Vaughn), the analogical reasoner returns conflicting arguments for this antecedent.
A portion of the reduction graph supporting the proposition that Jarek’s traveling was
in furtherance of his employment is shown in Fig. 13. In Fig. 13, “Janak-REF-PC” is a
precedent constituent from the (unfortunately named) case of Janak v. Texas Employer’s
Ins. Co., 381 S.W.2d 176 (1964), representing the conclusion of the court in that case that
Vaughn was directed to get lunch at a particular time to accomodate his employer’s schedule. Vaughn-ifo-pc
represents the court’s conclusion that Vaughn’s traveling was in furtherance of employment, given that his travel
was “necessitated” by his employer’s scheduling decision and that he was directed to get food when he did.
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Table 3
Precedent constituents appearing in GREBE’s analysis of Jarek’s Case, together with the case in which the
precedent constituent appears and the legal predicate that it supports
Precedent const. Case Legal predicate
Vaughn-ifo-pc Vaughn v. Highland Underwriters activity in furtherance
Ins. Co., 445 S.W.2d 234 (1969) of employment
Typical-commuting- American General Ins. v. Coleman activity NOT in furtherance
home-not-ifo-pc 157 Tx. 377, 303 S.W.2d 370 of employment
Janak-ref-pc Janak v. Texas Employer’s Ins. reasonably necessary
Co., 381 S.W.2d 176 (1964) for employment
ice water was “reasonably essential” for the performance of oil-drillers’ duties at a well
in south Texas in mid-summer. The three precedent constituents appearing in GREBE’s
analysis of Jarek’s Case are set forth in Table 3.
The resulting analysis is passed to the memorandum generator, which converts the
analysis into its English equivalent. The output of the memo generator begins by restating
the goal proposition, followed by two reductions using legal rules:24
Query: Is Denver and Rio Grande railroad liable under worker
compensation to Jarek for Jarek’s injury?
24 Each of the excerpts of GREBE’s analysis, printed in typewriter font, is verbatim text from GREBE’s
memorandum generator.
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Under Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Civ.St. article 8309 section 1b, Denver
and Rio Grande railroad is liable under worker compensation to
Jarek for Jarek’s injury if:
Jarek’s injury was sustained by Jarek while engaged in the
special trip home in the course of employment by Denver and
Rio Grande railroad.
This conclusion follows from Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Civ.St.
article 8309 section 1b if:
a. Jarek was employed by Denver and Rio Grande railroad,
as stated in the given facts.
b. Jarek’s injury occurred during the special trip home,
as stated in the given facts.
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c. The special trip home was an activity in furtherance
of Jarek’s employment.
Jarek’s Case is then analogized to the most similar precedent constituents that can
warrant “activity in furtherance of employment” and “not an activity in furtherance of
employment”:
Two conflicting arguments can be made concerning
whether the special trip home was an activity in
furtherance of Jarek’s employment.
The stronger argument is that:
The special trip home was not an activity in
furtherance of Jarek’s employment.
This conclusion follows from the very strong
analogy between the given case and the facts that
are relevant to the conclusion that ordinary
commuting from work is not an activity in
furtherance of a typical employee’s employment as
held in American General Ins. v. Coleman,
157 Tx. 377, 303 S.W.2d 370.
American General Ins. v. Coleman, 157 Tx. 377, 303 S.W.2d 370, is not itself a
typical commuting case, but is a frequently cited authority for the proposition that ordinary
commuting is not an activity in furtherance of employment.
The memo then continues with an argument that Jarek’s traveling was in furtherance of
his employment.
However, a weaker argument can be made that:
The special trip home was an activity in
furtherance of Jarek’s employment.
This conclusion follows from the strong analogy
between the given case and the facts of Vaughn v.
Highlands Underwriters Ins. Co., 445 S.W.2d 234
(1969) that were relevant to the conclusion that
the trip from the factory to a restaurant was an
activity in furtherance of Vaughn’s employment.
The memo sets forth the three semantic and two analogical arguments that support the
match between Jarek’s Case and Vaughn, together with the relevant differences between the
cases. Two propositions having semantic arguments—that the Railroad was the permitter
and that Jarek was the permittee of Jarek’s special trip home—are aggregated by the
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memorandum generator to form a single sentence stating that the Railroad permitted
Jarek’s special travel home.
This analogy is supported by the following
inferences:
A. That Denver and Rio Grande railroad
permitted the special trip home, which is
stated in the facts of the given case, is
similar to the fact that Apf Co directed the
trip from the factory to a restaurant.
B. Jarek’s being at home was reasonably
essential for Jarek’s employment duties.
This conclusion follows from the weak
analogy between the given case and the facts
of Janak v. Texas Employer’s Ins. Co.,
381 S.W.2d 176 (1964) that were relevant to
the conclusion that icewater being at Ecleto
was reasonably essential for oil drilling by
the Janak crew.
This analogy is supported by the following
inference:
That Jarek had the need to inform his
wife, which is stated in the facts of
the given case, is similar to the fact
that the Janak crew had the need to
keep cool.
Relevant differences between the given case
and Janak v. Texas Employer’s Ins. Co.,
381 S.W.2d 176 (1964) with respect to the
issue whether Jarek’s being at home was
reasonably essential for Jarek’s employment
duties are that:
- Jarek’s employment duties was not
impeded by the fact that the need to
inform his wife was of high intensity.
Whereas in the Janak case:
- Oil drilling by the Janak crew was
impeded by the fact that the need for
cooling was of high intensity.
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Denver and Rio Grande’s instruction to work
late.
This conclusion follows from the very strong
analogy between the given case and the facts
of Vaughn v. Highlands Underwriters Ins.
Co., 445 S.W.2d 234 (1969) that were
relevant to the conclusion that the trip
from the factory to a restaurant was
necessitated by Apf. Co.’s instructions to
Vaughn.
This analogy is supported by the following
inference:
Jarek’s being at home was reasonably
essential for Jarek’s employment
duties, as was shown above.
D. That Jarek walked during the special trip
home, which is stated in the facts of the
given case, is similar to the fact that
Vaughn was the driver during the trip from
the factory to a restaurant.
This analysis illustrates how two strong competing arguments can be made in Jarek’s
Case. Jarek’s Case closely resembles ordinary commuting, which is not an activity
in furtherance of employment. The Massachusetts Supreme Court found this argument
persuasive and therefore denied benefits to Jarek. However, Jarek’s traveling would not
have been necessary except for the actions of his employer. This similarity argues that
Jarek’s traveling was, like Vaughn’s, an activity in furtherance of employment.
From GREBE’s analysis, it appears that the second argument is weaker under Texas
case law than the first because Jarek’s Case fails to match Vaughn in two relevant respects.
First, there was no evidence that Jarek’s ability to perform his employment duties would
have been impeded by his need to inform his wife of his schedule change. Second, Jarek
was merely permitted, rather than directed, to go home. These differences are set forth in
GREBE’s analysis and form the basis of GREBE’s higher rating for the argument against
workers’ compensation liability.
6. Empirical evaluation of GREBE
This section describes an experimental evaluation of GREBE in which GREBE’s
analysis of 18 worker’s compensation cases was compared to the analysis of the same
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cases by law students.25 The purpose of the evaluation was primarily to assess the
overall effectiveness of GREBE in addressing this task, but a secondary purpose was to
demonstrate that analysis of worker’s compensation cases is a challenging task, even for
humans with legal training.
The experiment was conducted as follows. Five students at the University of Texas
Law School, responding to an advertisement for several “short legal-research projects”,
were each presented with a different group of three or four related hypothetical worker’s
compensation cases. For each hypothetical case, the students were asked to perform
whatever research was necessary to determine the applicable legal warrants, construct
the strongest arguments for and against worker’s compensation liability based on those
warrants, and set forth the arguments in a short memorandum. The subjects were asked to
record the length of time they spent on each problem. Three of the subjects were second-
year Juris Doctor students, and two had foreign law degrees and were enrolled in the
Master’s of Comparative Law program. Each student was paid for his or her participation.
The memoranda produced by the students, together with GREBE’s analysis of the same
18 hypothetical cases, were then given to a domain expert, an attorney who is a recognized
authority on Texas worker’s compensation law. The domain expert was asked to grade all
of the analyses, applying the following criteria:
(1) Issues. Does the memorandum correctly identify the relevant legal issues?
(2) Warrants. Have the legal warrants (rules and precedents) applicable to the issues been
identified?
(3) Explanations. Are the explanations contained in the memorandum complete, sound,
and persuasive?
The domain expert was asked to use the three criteria to assign each analysis an overall
grade. The grades were converted to their numeric equivalent on a 4-point scale and
averaged for each of the four categories. Fig. 14 displays the ratio of GREBE’s mean score
to that of the students.
Analyzing the worker’s compensation cases was clearly a challenging task for the law
students. The average student solution time was 2.77 hours (an average of 5.12 hours for
the first problem in each set), and the overall grade on the analyses they produced was
only 1.78, equivalent to a C−. GREBE’s analyses almost always received a slightly higher
grade, an average overall of 2.0.
In only one problem did GREBE receive a lower grade than a student. In that case
GREBE received an F for not identifying the issue that the injured worker might have
been an independent contractor rather than an employee, whereas the student identified
this issue. GREBE failed to identify this issue because its knowledge base simply has no
information about the distinction between employees and independent contractors. In two
other cases, both a student and GREBE were down-graded for failing to identify potentially
relevant warrants that were outside of GREBE’s knowledge base. These grades reflect more
25 The evaluation, which was performed in 1990, is described in greater detail in [18].
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directly on the incompleteness of the worker’s compensation knowledge base than on the
reduction graph model of legal analysis itself.
This evaluation is tentative for two reasons. First, the accuracy of the evaluation is
uncertain because it rests upon the judgment of a single domain expert. The paucity of
objective standards for evaluating legal analysis makes it desirable to base an evaluation
upon the judgment of multiple domain experts. A second reason that the evaluation is
tentative is that it fails to isolate the contributions of the various components of the
GREBE system. An ablation study is needed to determine relative importance of factors,
including not just the reduction-graph representation of the precedents in the workmen’s
compensation knowledge base, but also the expressiveness of the representation language
for case-descriptions, and the completeness, consistency, and validity of the representation
of legal rules.
7. Summary
This paper has described a reduction-graph model of legal precedent that makes explicit
the theory of decision of the precedent. This model accounts for the phenomenon that
the theory under which a precedent is decided determines its relevance to subsequent
cases. A wide variety of architectures for legal analysis are consistent with the reduction-
graph model of precedent. One such architecture is GREBE, which uses a relational
representation of facts, structure matching for similarity assessment, and a control strategy
that treats rules, precedents, and semantic relations in a uniform fashion. A preliminary
evaluation of GREBE using a knowledge base in the domain of workmen’s compensation
law indicated that reduction-graph representation of precedents can lead to legal analyses
comparable in quality to those of law students.
Automated legal reasoning systems have the potential to reduce the costs, and increase
the availability, of legal services [10]. Achieving the goal of large-scale precedent-based
systems will require solving the difficult knowledge-acquisition challenge of converting
very large numbers of precedents expressed in natural language into a formal representation
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amenable to automated techniques. However, identifying the minimal requirements for
a representation of precedents sufficient for automated legal analysis is a prerequisite
for developing practical automated legal problem-solving system. The reduction-graph
model of precedent is intended to be a contribution to the process of identifying such
requirements.
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